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Abstract In the European Union Emissions Trading System, the supply of carbon permits
is determined in a decentralized manner by Member States. Alternatively, the supply could be
determined by an EU central authority. We analyze whether decentralization leads to lower
total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of Member States and
the privacy of information about their abatement costs. If Member States do not behave stra-
tegically, then decentralization is preferred, regardless of whether abatement costs are private
information. If the Member States behave strategically, then decentralization may or may not
be preferred, depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, the
variation in emission endowments, and the number of Member States.
Keywords Decentralization · Emissions trading · European Union · Pollution abatement ·
Private information
1 Introduction
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the second large scale policy
application of pollution permit markets, following the US sulfur permit market. As described
by Kruger et al. (2007) and Böhringer et al. (2005), the structures of the two markets dif-
fer significantly. In the EU ETS, the supply of carbon dioxide permits is determined in
a decentralized manner. Each Member State allocates an endowment of emissions to the
permit market. The sum of these allocations over all Member States yields the supply. In
the US sulfur permit market, the supply is determined by a single regulatory authority.
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Kruger et al. (2007) ask whether a similar arrangement might improve the performance of the
EU ETS: rather than having each Member State allocate emissions, might it be better to have
the EU central government make these decisions? The question is particularly relevant given
that the EU’s recent proposal for subsequent periods of the EU ETS does indeed recommend
a centralized determination of permit supply (Commission of the European Communities
2008). Clearly there is an opportunity for economic analysis to inform the debate.
In this paper we identify some advantages and disadvantages of such centralized deci-
sion making. We construct a formal model containing these elements and delineate con-
ditions under which centralization is preferred to the current decentralized structure of the
EU ETS. Although political economy considerations such as “competitiveness” between
emission sources in various Member States may play a role in actual policy deliberations,
we abstract from such issues here and focus solely on Member States’ costs of abating
emissions.
It is natural to consider two abatement cost functions for each Member State because the
EU ETS divides the sources of carbon emissions into two sectors, trading and non-trading.
Each Member State has a fixed endowment of carbon emissions (the sum of which is equal
to the EU-wide Kyoto Protocol target). A Member State allocates its endowment between
the two sectors for sources within its border. The amount of emissions allocated to the non-
trading sector directly determines the abatement costs for that sector. But the amount of
emissions allocated to the trading sector, aggregated over all Member States, determines the
supply of permits in the EU ETS. After the supply has been determined, the market opens
and individual trading-sector sources in the various Member States may buy and sell permits.
These market actions determine the abatement costs in the trading sector.
We analyze the interplay between behavior, information, and decentralization. We assume
the EU central authority seeks to minimize total abatement costs, subject to the constraints
on the Member States’ emission endowments. In contrast, we assume each Member State
is concerned with only its own abatement costs. Moreover, because there are relatively few
Member States, a given Member State may act strategically when considering the amount
of emissions to allocate to the trading sector. These considerations offer an advantage to
centralization. Alternatively, one of the main tenets in the fiscal federalism literature is that
local governments “possess knowledge of both local preferences and cost conditions that a
central agency is unlikely to have” (Oates 1999, p 1123). Applying this insight to the EU ETS
suggests that the Member States have better information about their own abatement costs
than does the EU central authority. This consideration offers an advantage to decentralization.
The information of the Member States themselves in regard to the abatement costs of other
Member States is yet another consideration. While perhaps not as obvious as the others, we
will see the consideration that abatement costs are private information offers an advantage
to centralization.
Following Vives (2002), we consider four combinations of behavior and information
for the Member States. In each case we compare the total abatement costs of the existing
decentralized system to an alternative centralized system. When behavior is strategic, the
Member States account for the fact that their allocations to the trading sector subsequently
influence the price in the permit market. Thus, a Member State may want to manipulate the
price to lower its abatement costs. When behavior is nonstrategic, the Member States do not
account for the effect of their allocations on the permit price. Regardless of the behavior of
the Member States, we assume that the permit market itself is competitive, given the supply
of permits. This is because the market consists of over 12,000 sources, so no single source
has market power. The information of the Member States about the other Member States’
abatement costs gives rise to our two information structures. When there is full information,
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the abatement costs are common knowledge among the Member States. When there is pri-
vate-information, the abatement costs of a Member State are private information to that
state.
Because aggregate carbon emissions are fixed by the Kyoto Protocol, cost-effectiveness
is the appropriate first-best welfare criterion for evaluating the EU ETS. In the cost-effective
solution, total abatement costs are minimized subject to the constraint that total emissions
equal the Kyoto protocol target. Our benchmark case consists of full information and non-
strategic behavior: under fairly general conditions, we show that the decentralized system is
cost-effective and so is clearly preferred to the centralized system. Although this result offers
support for the current design of the EU ETS, one might argue that it is unrealistic to assume
that Member States will behave nonstrategically and that they have full information about
abatement costs. To see the effects of relaxing these assumptions, we restrict the model to
quadratic abatement costs and determine whether the decentralized system or the centralized
system leads to lower total abatement costs. Private information increases the relative costs
of decentralization, but as long as Member States are nonstrategic, decentralization is still
preferred. Strategic behavior also increases the relative costs of decentralization, and in fact
this increase is large enough to make the choice between centralization and decentralization
ambiguous. With strategic behavior, it is possible that the centralization leads to lower costs,
depending on the number of Member States, the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost
parameters, and the variation in emission endowments.
It is interesting to interpret our results in the context of the EU principle of subsidiarity,
a legal principle designed to be a check on central authority. According to this principle,
actions should generally be taken at the Member State level, unless actions at the EU level
would be more effective. Our results identify conditions under which the centralized system
leads to lower expected total costs that the decentralized system, and hence actions at the EU
level may be appropriate.
2 The Models and a Benchmark Solution
2.1 The General Model
Let W be the EU-wide Kyoto protocol target level of emissions. Because this is fixed, we need
only consider abatement cost functions, not damage from emissions. There are m Member
States, where m ≥ 2. Let wi be the Kyoto endowment of emissions for Member State i ,
with
∑
wi = W . The average endowment is w¯ = W/m and the variance of the endowment
is var(w) = (1/m)∑(wi − w¯)2. The two sectors in each Member State are summarized
by their abatement cost functions. Let cti (ti ) be the abatement cost in the trading sector of
Member State i as a function of emissions of the trading sector ti ; let cni (ni ) be the abate-
ment cost in the non-trading sector as a function of emissions of the non-trading sector ni .
We refer to −∂c ji (x)/∂x as the marginal abatement cost in sector j of Member State i ,
where i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j ∈ {t, n}. The minus sign arises because increases in abatement
correspond to reductions in emissions. As is standard, we assume that marginal abatement
cost functions are positive decreasing functions of emissions.
We define an emissions profile (ti , ni )mi=1 to be cost-effective if it minimizes aggregate
abatement costs, subject to the constraint that total emissions equal W . A planner with full
information about abatement costs would solve
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(cti (ti ) + cni (ni ))
such that
∑
(ti + ni ) = W. (1)
The first-order conditions imply that the marginal abatement costs are equal across sectors
within a Member State and also equal across all Member States. Let the solution to this
problem be denoted by (t∗i , n∗i )
m
i=1.
Our information structures are drawn from the Industrial Organization literature, where it
is sometimes assumed that rival firms know each others cost parameters, but a government
regulator does not (see for example, Bernheim and Whinston 1986). In our model, Member
States correspond to rival firms and the EU central authority corresponds to the government
regulator. So we initially assume that, in the full-information case, Member States have better
information than the EU central authority about other Member States’ abatement costs. Alter-
natively, one might argue that when the Member States know each others’ abatement costs,
the EU central authority knows them as well. In Sect. 3.6 we present a complete analysis of
the model under this alternative assumption.
2.2 The Decentralized Solution
Now consider the decentralized problem facing each Member State. A Member State must
decide how to allocate its Kyoto endowment of emissions, wi , between the trading and non-
trading sectors. Suppose that Member State i allocates emissions ei to the trading sector.
It immediately follows that emissions of the non-trading sector are wi − ei . We refer to
the relation ei + ni = wi as the emission-endowment constraint. Emissions of the trading
sector, ti , will not generally equal ei , however, as sources in the trading sector will buy and
sell permits. The exact form for a Member State’s decentralized problem will depend on the
various combinations of information and behavior.
Member States may or may not account for how their choice of ei influences the permit
price. But, because many sources buy and sell permits, we assume that, the permit market
itself is competitive once the sector allocations have been specified. It is well known that a
competitive permit market equilibrium minimizes aggregate abatement costs. A convenient
way to characterize the equilibrium uses the aggregate abatement cost function for the trading
sector, defined as






ti = E, (2)
where E , the supply of permits, equals
∑
ei . The Lagrange multiplier for this problem cor-







the familiar result that marginal abatement cost equals the permit price. Equation (3) defines
the trading-sector constraint. It delineates how the emissions of the trading sector are deter-
mined by the market price of permits.
Because we assume the permit market is competitive, the variable ti is not a choice var-
iable for the Member States. Given the price of permits (which will indeed depend on the
choice variables ei ), the variable ti is completely determined by the trading sector constraint,
123
Strategic Behavior, Private Information, the European Union Emissions Trading System 417
and in turn ti determines the trading sector abatement costs. For all the cases we consider,
then, a strategy for each member state is simply a choice of ei .
2.3 A Decentralization Benchmark: Full Information and Nonstrategic Behavior
Consider first the combination of full information and nonstrategic behavior. Member State
i selects ei to minimize the sum of abatement costs and permit expenditures, subject to the
trading-sector constraint and the emission-endowment constraint. So Member State i solves
min
ei
cti (ti ) + cni (ni ) + p(ti − ei ) (4)





ei + ni = wi
ei ≥ 0 ni ≥ 0.
Because the Member State does not behave strategically (i.e., it does not account for the
effect of its decisions on the market price of permits) the trading-sector constraint is not a
function of ei and hence is superfluous for determining ei . Substituting the emission-endow-
ment constraint into the objective function (4) yields a problem in terms of the single variable
ei . The first-order condition for an interior solution requires that the marginal abatement cost
in the non-trading sector equals the price of permits.
Even though a Member State does not account for the effect of its decisions on the market
price of permits, it does account for the choices of the other Member States. The solution to
the decentralized system is thus described by a Nash equilibrium. A profile of allocations to
the trading sector is a Nash equilibrium if ei solves (4) for each i . To determine this equilib-
rium, one solves the m first-order conditions for the m choice variables ei . At first blush, it
may seem difficult to solve for the equilibrium because the price appears in the first-order
conditions. By solving (2), we can determine the market price as a function of ∑ ei , so the
first-order conditions can be written exclusively in terms of the variables ei . Given the Nash




i are determined by the trading-sector and
emission endowment constraints (the superscript d denotes “decentralized”).
Our first main result gives conditions under which the decentralized solution is cost-effec-
tive. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the Member States have full information and do not behave
strategically. If wi > n∗i for each i , then the decentralized solution is cost-effective.
Consider the intuition for Proposition 1. Each Member State sets the marginal abatement
cost in the non-trading sector equal to the market price of permits. In the equilibrium of
the permit market, the trading sector constraint implies that marginal abatement costs in the
trading sector equal the market price of permits. Thus, marginal abatement costs are equal
across both sectors within a Member State and also equal across all Member States. This is
the condition for cost-effectiveness.
In subsequent sections, we analyze what happens when Member States do not have full
information (hence the market price is uncertain) or they behave strategically (hence they
account for the influence of their choice of ei on the market price).
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2.4 The Centralized Solution
In the centralized solution, the EU central authority determines how the Kyoto endowment
of emissions is allocated between the trading and non-trading sectors for each Member State.
The sum of the allocations of emissions to the trading sector yields the supply of permits.
Then the permit market opens and the emissions of the trading sectors across Member States
are determined by the market. Hence the emissions of the trading sector, ti , for a given Mem-
ber State will generally be different from the allocation of emissions, ei , assigned by the EU
central authority to that Member State.











E[ cni (ni )
]
such that ei + ni = wi , i = 1, . . . , m,
ei ≥ 0 ni ≥ 0,
where E[ · ] denotes the expectation operator. Substituting the constraints into the objective
function yields a problem in terms of the m choice variables ei . The first-order condition for












By the Envelope Theorem, the first term is equal to the negative of the expected market price.
So the first-order condition indicates that expected price is equal to the expected marginal
abatement costs in the non-trading sector.
The centralized solution is described by the quantities eci , n
c
i , and t
c
i (the superscript
c denotes “centralized”). The values for eci are found by solving the system of m equa-
tions specified by (5). The values for nci follow from the emission-endowment constraint
ei + ni = wi . In the trading sector, firms will purchase permits until the marginal abate-
ment costs equal price. Thus the values for tci follow from the trading-sector constraint (3).
See the Appendix for details of these calculations.
3 Centralization Versus Decentralization: The Roles of Private Information
and Strategic Behavior
We now compare the centralized solution to the various decentralized solutions. To determine
a given decentralized solution, we first solve a system of first-order conditions for the Mem-
ber States’ allocations of emissions to the trading sector (as the Nash equilibrium is defined
with respect to these variables). The allocation of emissions to the non-trading sector and the
emissions of the trading sector then follow by the emission-endowment and trading-sector
constraints.
To obtain an analytical solution, we consider a special case of quadratic abatement costs.
Let the non-trading sector abatement costs be given by
cni (ni ) = Ai − γi ni + (µ/2)(ni )2,
and let the trading sector abatement costs be given by
cti (ti ) = Di − θi ti + (λ/2)(ti )2.
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The parameters Ai and Di simply define the cost of obtaining zero emissions and they do not
play a role in our analysis. The relevant heterogeneity between Member States is captured
solely by the parameters γi and θi . The parameters µ and λ are common knowledge to all
Member States and the EU central authority. In the absence of any regulation, the sectors
would emit γi/µ and θi/λ, where the marginal benefit (to firms) of additional emissions is
zero. These are commonly called the “business-as-usual” levels of emissions. By substituting
the quadratic cost functions into (2) and solving for the Lagrange multiplier, we see that the
equilibrium price of permits is
p = θ¯ − λe¯, (6)
where e¯ = (1/m)∑ ei is the average permit supply.
In the quadratic-cost model, our two information structures relate to the parameters γi
and θi . We consider cases in which the Member States have full information or private infor-
mation about these parameters. When there is full information, the γi ’s and θi ’s are common
knowledge among the Member States. When there is private information, Member State i
knows the value of its own parameters, but considers γ j to be a random variable with expected
value γ˜ and variance σ 2γ , and considers θ j to be a random variable with expected value θ˜ and
variance σ 2θ . A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decentralized solution
in the private-information case. In either case, the Member States have an informational
advantage over the EU central authority. (We will relax this assumption in Sect. 3.6.) The
EU central authority does not know the true values for the γi ’s and considers them to be
random variables with expected value γ˜ and variance σ 2γ . Likewise, the EU central authority
considers the θi ’s to be random variables with expected value θ˜ and variance σ 2θ . We assume
all the random variables are independent of each other.
We start with the full-information, nonstrategic case. From Proposition 1, we know that
decentralization is better than centralization in this case, but it is instructive to show this for
the quadratic abatement cost functions before tackling the private-information and strategic
cases.
3.1 The Full-Information, Nonstrategic Case
As discussed above, in this case each Member State i solves (4). The solution for ei is
described by the first-order condition
−∂c
n
i (wi − ei )
∂ni
= p.
With the quadratic abatement cost functions, this becomes
γi − µ(wi − ei ) = p. (7)
Using the expression for p from (6), we can solve the m equations from (7) for the Nash
equilibrium quantities edi . The values for t
d
i are found from the trading-sector constraint (3).
Finally, the values for ndi are determined by the emission-endowment constraint ei +ni = wi .
See the Appendix for details of these calculations.
We can now compare the expected total costs of the decentralized solution, Cd , to the






















E[ cti (tci )
] +
∑
E[ cni (nci )
]
.
In the Appendix, we show that the difference between expected total costs is











2(µ + λ) .
As expected from Proposition 1, this expression is negative, implying that decentralization
leads to lower expected total costs than centralization. As the number of Member States




Turning now to the other cases, we first describe the decentralized solution for each case.
In particular, we determine the first-order conditions for edi . Rather than discussing the com-
parison to the centralized solution on a case by case basis, we wait until all the cases have
been described and then make the comparisons all at once.
3.2 The Full-Information, Strategic Case
In this case, we continue to assume that Member States have full information about the γi ’s
and θi ’s, but they do account for the effect of ei on the price of permits. Recall from (6) that
the market price of permits is θ¯ − λe¯. Thus, Member State i solves
min
ei
cti (ti ) + cni (ni ) + (θ¯ − λe¯)(ti − ei ) (8)
such that θi − λti = θ¯ − λe¯ (9)
ei + ni = wi
ei ≥ 0 ni ≥ 0.
The trading-sector constraint (9) is now a critical part of the Member State’s problem. The
Member State realizes that the choice of ei influences the price of permits, which determines
the emissions of the trading sector, which in turn determines trading sector abatement costs.
Substituting the trading-sector and emission endowment constraints into the objective func-
tion yields a problem in terms of a single variable ei . The first-order condition for an interior
solution is
γi − µ(wi − ei ) − (θ¯ − λe¯) − (1/m)(θi − θ¯ + λe¯) + (λ/m)ei = 0. (10)
The Nash equilibrium is found by solving the set of m equations corresponding
to (10).
To interpret the behavior of the Member States in this case, we use (9) to rewrite (10) as
γi − µ(wi − ei )︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC=−∂cni /∂ni




−(λ/m)ti = 0. (11)
The term labeled MC is analogous to the marginal cost of production for a traditional Cour-
not oligopolist. (For a Member State, the cost of “producing” ei is that non-trading sector
emissions must be reduced by an equivalent amount.) The term labeled MR is analogous
to the marginal revenue for a traditional oligopolist facing demand curve p(e¯) = θ¯ − λe¯.
Suppose for the moment that a given Member State did not have any sources in the trad-
ing sector. Then such a Member State would indeed act as a traditional oligopolist and set
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Fig. 1 Strategic behavior
MC equal to MR so that “profit” from permit sales is maximized. Now return to our gen-
eral model in which the Member State does have sources in the trading sector. Intuitively,
the Member State behaves differently from a Cournot oligopolist because it accounts for
the fact that some of the demand for permits comes from its own trading sector. Indeed,
Eq. (11) shows that, in addition to marginal cost and marginal revenue, there is an additional
term (λ/m)ti due to the trading sector. So marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue at the
optimal ei .
Figure 1 gives a graphical explanation of (11), particularly the source of the (λ/m)ti
term. Starting with a traditional Cournot oligopoly diagram (consisting of MC, D, and M R
curves) we have added the Member State’s marginal abatement cost in the trading sector.
The marginal cost curve—equal to the marginal abatement cost in the non-trading sec-
tor—slopes upward because it is presented as a function of ei rather than ni (reflecting the
emission-endowment constraint). Conversely, the marginal abatement cost in the trading
sector slopes downward because it is presented directly in terms of ti . The demand curve
is equal to the horizontal sum of all Member States’ non-trading sector marginal abatement
cost curves and hence lies above the non-trading sector marginal abatement cost curve of
the individual Member State. Suppose that the Member State initially selects an endow-
ment of emissions eˆi such that marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. This yields a
market price for permits pˆ and trading sector emissions tˆi (where price is equal to mar-
ginal abatement cost). At this point, profit from permit sales is maximized, but we must
also account for total expenditures in the trading sector. Total expenditures include permit
purchases (the striped rectangle) and abatement cost (the striped triangle). Now consider
a small increase in the endowment of emissions from eˆi to eˆi + ei . From the demand
curve, this leads to a change in price of p = −(λ/m)ei . The first-order change in
total expenditures in the trading sector is tˆi ∗ p = −(λ/m)tˆiei . This dominates the
first-order change in profit from permit sales (which is zero), so the welfare of the Mem-
ber State increases. From (11), we see that the Member State should continue to increase
eˆi until the loss in profit on permit sales is just equal to the reduction in trading sector
expenditures.
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3.3 The Private-Information, Nonstrategic Case
In this case, the parameters γi and θi are private information to Member State i . Thus, a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept. Member State i solves
min
ei
E[ cti (ti ) + cni (ni ) + p(ti − ei )|γi , θi
] (12)
such that θi − λti = p (13)
ei + ni = wi
ei ≥ 0 ni ≥ 0.
As with the other nonstrategic case, the trading-sector constraint (13) is not needed to solve
for ei . After substituting the emission-endowment constraint into the objective function, the
first-order condition for an interior solution is
γi − µ(wi − ei ) − E
[
p | γi , θi
] = 0. (14)
In the non-trading sector the marginal abatement cost is equal to the expected price for permits.
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is found by solving the set of m equations corresponding to
(14).
3.4 The Private-Information, Strategic Case
In the final case, Member States account for the effect of ei on price and also have private
information about abatement costs. Member State i solves
min
ei
E[ cti (ti ) + cni (ni ) + (θ¯ − λe¯)(ti − ei )|γi , θi
] (15)
such that θi − λti = (θ¯ − λe¯) (16)
ei + ni = wi
ei ≥ 0 ni ≥ 0.
Following the other strategic case, we substitute the emission-endowment and trading-sector
constraints into the objective function. The first-order condition is
γi − µ(wi − ei ) − E
[ (
θ¯ − λe¯) + (1/m) (θi − θ¯ + λe¯
) − (λ/m)ei | γi , θi
] = 0. (17)
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is found by solving the set of m equations corresponding
to (17).
3.5 Comparisons
We now make the centralization versus decentralization comparisons, following the tem-
plate of the full-information, nonstrategic case. Solving the appropriate system of first-order
equations for edi yields the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. The constraints determine tdi and
ndi , from which the cost difference Cd − Cc can be calculated. We provide details of these
calculations in the Appendix. The results, including the full-information, nonstrategic case
for reference, are shown in Table 1. If Cd − Cc is negative, then decentralization leads to lower
expected total costs than centralization.
The results in Table 1 enable us to isolate the effects of private information and behavior.
Consider, for example, the first and third rows. The difference between Cd – Cc in these rows
gives the effect of moving from full information to private information, keeping behavior
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Table 1 Summary of results

















































θ (2m − 1) ((2m−1)λ+mµ)2(m2µ+λ(2m−1))2
Strategic
constant at nonstrategic. This and similar calculations yield the following proposition. (The
proof is straightforward but algebraically tedious.)
Proposition 2 Keeping behavior constant, moving from full information to private informa-
tion increases Cd − Cc. Keeping information constant, moving from nonstrategic behavior
to strategic behavior also increases Cd − Cc.
Proposition 2 shows that the difference in expected total costs is greater when the Member
States have private information than when they have full information. Thus private informa-
tion confers an advantage to centralization. Likewise, the difference in expected total costs is
greater when the Member States behave strategically than when they behave nonstrategically.
Thus, strategic behavior also confers an advantage to centralization.
Turning now to the question of whether the current structure of the EU ETS can be
improved by centralization, the following proposition follows directly from Table 1.
Proposition 3 If Member States are nonstrategic, then Cd − Cc < 0.
Proposition 3 shows that decentralization leads to lower expected total costs when Mem-
bers States are nonstrategic, regardless of whether information is full or private. (Recall that
Member States have an informational advantage over the central authority.) Combining the
results of Propositions 2 and 3 shows that, if Member States are nonstrategic, then even though
private information makes centralization more appealing, the increase in the cost difference
is not enough to make centralization the better choice.
If Member States are strategic, then the sign of Cd − Cc is ambiguous for both full and
private information. For these cases, Cd − Cc depends on three terms (see Table 1). The first
term is positive and the other terms are negative, implying that either decentralization or
centralization may lead to lower total expected costs, depending on the values of the parame-
ters σ 2γ , σ
2
θ , var(w), and m. The effects of the informational parameters are straightforward.
Suppose that σ 2γ , the variance of the EU central authority’s uncertainty about non-trading
sector abatement costs, increases. Then the magnitude of the second term increases, which
makes it more likely that decentralization is preferred. A similar result holds for σ 2θ , the
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variance of the EU central authority’s uncertainty about trading sector abatement costs. As
both variances go to zero, centralization is preferred.
Now consider the variance of the Kyoto emission endowments. If var(w) increases, then
the magnitude of the first term increases, which makes it more likely that centralization is
preferred. If var(w) goes to zero, then decentralization is preferred. We see that the ability
of the Member States to manipulate the permit market is related to the distribution of the
Kyoto emission endowments. In actual practice, there is wide variation in the Kyoto emis-
sion endowments (see Convery and Redmond 2007) and hence we might expect a significant
degree of strategic behavior. Although he considers a different market structure, Hahn (1984)
also finds that the distribution of the emission endowments plays a critical role in determining
the degree of market power.
The final parameter is m, the number of Member States. In its current form, the EU has
27 member states. Simple intuition suggests that as the number of Member States increases,
the ability of a given Member State to manipulate the market to its advantage decreases. So
for large values of m, the decentralized system should lead to lower total expected costs. The
effect of an increase in m on the first term is ambiguous. Suppose for the moment, though,
that var(w) is kept constant with respect to m. As m increases, the magnitude of the first term
decreases to zero and the magnitude of the second term increases. So for large enough m,
the cost difference must be negative, confirming our intuition that only for small values of m
is it possible that centralization is preferred to decentralization. This result continues to hold
even if var(w) “modestly” increases in m.
3.6 Alternative Informational Assumptions
As discussed above, one might argue that when the Member States have full information,
then the EU central authority has full information as well. It is easy to adapt our analysis to
account for this possibility. Suppose that ex ante, the γi ’s and θi ’s are random variables, and
when there is full information, these parameters are revealed to both the EU and the Member
States before they make their decisions. When there is private information, γi and θi are only
revealed to Member State i . The analysis of private information is thus the same as before,
only the full-information cases require a new calculation. In other words, the entries in the
first and second rows of Table 1 would change, but the entries in the third and fourth rows
would not.
For full information, then, we first determine a new centralized solution, and then compare
this solution to the decentralized solution for the two types of behavior. It turns out that the
new centralized solution is exactly the same as the decentralized full-information, nonstrate-
gic solution. So the new entry in the first row of Table 1 would be zero. The new entry in the
second row, reflecting the ex ante value of Cd − Cc for the full-information, strategic case,
would be
mµλ2
2(µm + λ)2 var(w) + σ
2
γ (m − 1)
λ2
2µ(µm + λ)2 + σ
2
θ (m − 1)
µ
2(µm + λ)2 .
This expression is positive, because in this case, the Member States do not have an infor-
mational advantage over the EU central authority and they behave strategically. So clearly
centralization is preferred.
The main effect of these changes is on the role of private information. Keeping behavior
constant, moving from full information to private information now decreases Cd − Cc. So
private information confers an advantage to decentralization. This is opposite to Proposition 2.
Why the difference? Proposition 2 identifies the effect of Member States’ moving from full
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information to private information, keeping the information of the EU central authority fixed.
The new result identifies the effect of both the Member States and the EU central author-
ity moving from full information to private information. Member States’ moving to private
information confers an advantage to centralization, but this effect is overwhelmed when the
EU central authority moves to private information as well.
4 Conclusion
Our findings offer guidance for the design of the EU permit market. Given the size and
prominence of this market, it will no doubt be a model for other regional permit systems.
So our findings will likely apply to them as well. The performance of a decentralized permit
system depends critically on whether the individual Member States behave strategically. If
they do not, then, within the context of our model, the permit market should be decentralized.
If they do, then the centralization versus decentralization question depends on the number of
Member States, the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, and the variance
of the Kyoto emission endowments.
For analytical clarity, we have analyzed the choice between two extreme systems. In the
decentralized system, the choice of permit endowment is determined solely by the Member
States, and in the centralized system, the choice of permit endowment is determined solely
by the EU central authority. In current practice, the EU ETS employs a modified form of the
decentralized system, in which the choices of the Member States must be approved by the
EU central authority. In a modified centralized system, these roles could be reversed. One
may perhaps analyze systems of this type by employing a leader-follower framework. It is
likely, however, that the parameters identified here will continue to play a critical role in the
comparison between centralization and decentralization.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank several anonymous referees for helpful comments and
suggestions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix







= − and ∂cni (n∗i )
∂ni
= −, where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the
constraint. The first-order condition for an interior solution to the decentralized problem (4)
is ∂c
n
i (wi −ei )
∂ni
= −p. By the trading-sector constraint, we also have ∂cti (ti )
∂ti
= −p. Let the
solution to these equations be given by tˆi and eˆi ; and let nˆi = wi − eˆi . We need to show that
tˆi = t∗i , nˆi = n∗i , and eˆi > 0.
First note that in equilibrium, we have
∑

















Next we show that p = . Suppose instead that p < . By the assumptions on the first and
second derivatives of ct and cn , we have tˆi > t∗i and nˆi > n∗i . But then
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Table 2 Expectations
γ θ γ and θ
E[ γ¯ ] = γ˜ E[ θ¯ ] = θ˜ E[ γi θ j









= σ 2θ /m + θ˜2 E
[
γ¯ θ¯
] = γ˜ θ˜
E[ γi γ¯
] = σ 2γ /m + γ˜ 2 E
[
θi θ¯
] = σ 2θ /m + θ˜2 E
[
γi θ¯
] = γ˜ θ˜
E[ S1 ] = 0 E[ S2 ] = 0 E
[
θi γ¯









= mσ 2θ E[ S1S2 ] = 0
E[ S2 θ¯





(tˆi + nˆi ) >
∑
(t∗i + n∗i ) = W,
a contradiction. Likewise, if p > , we get a contradiction. Thus, p =  and hence tˆi = t∗i
and nˆi = n∗i . It follows that eˆi = wi − nˆi = wi − n∗i > 0, where the last inequality follows
by the assumption that wi > n∗i . unionsq
Comparing the centralized solution to the decentralized solutions will involve the expec-
tations given in Table 2. Let S1 = ∑(γi − γ˜ ) and S2 = ∑(θi − θ˜ ).
Before analyzing the various solutions, we note that from (3) and (6), the trading-sector
constraint can be written as
ti = 1
λ
(θi − θ¯ ) + e¯. (18)
Member States with a greater than average cost parameter will have greater than average
emissions in the trading sector. For the nonstrategic cases, we use (18) to calculate emissions
in the trading sector after the equilibrium ei ’s have been determined. For the strategic cases,
we substitute (18) into the objective function for the Member States before taking the deriv-
ative with respect to ei . After the equilibrium ei ’s have been determined, we use (18) once
again to specify emissions in the trading sector.
Centralized Solution
The solution to the system of equations corresponding to (5) is
eci = wi +
1
µ + λ(θ˜ − γ˜ − λw¯),
hence
e¯ = 1
µ + λ(θ˜ − γ˜ + µw¯).
From the emission-endowment constraint we have
nci =
1
µ + λ(γ˜ − θ˜ + λw¯).




(θi − θ¯ ) + 1
µ + λ(θ˜ − γ˜ + µw¯).
123
Strategic Behavior, Private Information, the European Union Emissions Trading System 427
Full-information, Nonstrategic Case
The first task is to solve the first-order conditions (7). Substituting (6) for p into (7) yields
γi − µ(wi − ei ) − (θ¯ − λe¯) = 0.
Solving the set of m equations for the m unknowns ei gives the solution
edi = wi −
1
µ
(γi − γ¯ ) + 1
µ + λ(θ¯ − γ¯ − λw¯), (19)




(γi − γ¯ ) + 1
µ + λ(γ¯ − θ¯ + λw¯).




(θi − θ¯ ) + 1
µ + λ(θ¯ − γ¯ + µw¯).
The second task is to compare the decentralized solution to the centralized solution. First
note that tdi = Ki + 1µ+λ (θ¯ − γ¯ )and tci = Ki + 1µ+λ (θ˜ − γ˜ ), where Ki = 1λ (θi − θ¯ )+ µµ+λ w¯.













































2Ki ((θ¯ − γ¯ ) − (θ˜ − γ˜ ))
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+ λ
2(µ + λ)2 E
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(−θi + λKi )((θ¯ − γ¯ ) − (θ˜ − γ˜ ))
]
+ λ
2(µ + λ)2 E
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((θ¯ − γ¯ ) − (θ˜ − γ˜ ))
]
+ λ
2(µ + λ)2 (σ
2
γ /m + σ 2θ /m)
= 1
µ + λE
[ (−θ¯) ((θ¯ − γ¯ ) − (θ˜ − γ˜ ))
]
+ λ
2(µ + λ)2 (σ
2




θ /m + θ˜2) + θ˜2) +
λ
2(µ + λ)2 (σ
2
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Turning to the non-trading sector, we have nci = K + 1µ+λ (γ˜ − θ˜ ) and ndi = K + 1µ+λ
(γ¯ − θ¯ ) + 1
µ
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1
µ
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1
µ






















µ + λγi (γ¯ − θ¯ ) −
1
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2
µ(µ + λ) (γ¯ − θ¯ )(γi − γ¯ ) +
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The difference in expected total costs is given by
















E[ cti (tci )
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λσ 2γ
2(µ + λ)2 +
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2(µ + λ) .
Full-information, Strategic Case
The first-order condition (10) yields a set of m equations for the m unknowns ei . Solving this
system (and abusing the notation by again referring to the solution as edi ) gives
edi =
µ
µ + λ/m (wi − w¯) +
1
m(µ + λ/m) (θi − θ¯ ) −
1
µ + λ/m (γi − γ¯ )
+ 1
µ + λ(θ¯ − γ¯ + µw¯). (22)
Notice that the average supply of permits, e¯, will be the same as in the full-information,

























λ(wi − w¯) + (θ¯ − θi )
) + 1
µ + λ
(−θ¯ + λw¯) + 1
µ + λ γ¯ +
1
b
(γi − γ¯ ) ,
where b = µ + λ/m. So we write ndi = Bi + K + 1µ+λ (γ¯ − θ¯ ) + 1b (γi − γ¯ ) and nci =
K + 1












Bi + K + 1
µ + λ(γ¯ − θ¯ ) +
1
b





Bi + K + 1
µ + λ(γ¯ − θ¯ ) +
1
b
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Likewise for the centralized system we have
















We now proceed as before. Expand the terms in (24) and (25), subtract (25) from (24), collect























































Using (23) and (26), as well as the fact that ∑(wi − w¯) = 0, we have
Cd − Cc =
∑


































mσ 2γ − σ 2γ
)
.
This can be simplified to















µ2(m − 1 − m2) − (m + 1)λµ − λ2) .
Private-information, Nonstrategic Case
This is similar to the full-information, nonstrategic case. Substituting (6) for p into (14)
yields
γi − µ(wi − ei ) − E
[
θ¯ − λe¯ | γi
] = 0.
Solving the resulting set of m equations for the m unknowns ei gives the solution
edi = wi −
1
b
(γi − γ˜ ) + 1
µ + λ(θ˜ − γ˜ − λw¯) +
1
mb
(θi − θ˜ ), (27)
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(γi − γ˜ ) + 1
µ + λ(−θ˜ + γ˜ + λw¯) −
1
mb





(θi − θ¯ ) − 1
mb
∑
(γi − γ˜ ) + 1




(θi − θ˜ ).
To compare the decentralized solution to the centralized solution we write
ndi = nci +
1
b
(γi − γ˜ ) − 1
mb
(θi − θ˜ )
and






Following the usual steps yields







This is similar to the full-information, strategic case. The first-order condition (17) yields a
set of m equations for the m unknowns ei . Solving this system gives
edi =
µ






(θi − θ˜ ) − 1
a
(γi − γ˜ ) + 1
µ + λ(θ˜ − γ˜ + µw¯),
where a = µ + (λ/m) + (λ/m)(1 − 1/m). We can write ndi as
ndi =
1
µ + λ(γ˜ − θ˜ + λw¯) +
λ
mb






(θi − θ˜ ) + 1
a





(θi − θ¯ ) − 1
ma
∑
(γi − γ˜ ) + 1







(θi − θ˜ ).
To compare the decentralized solution to the centralized solution we write
ndi = nci +
λ
mb
(wi − w¯) + 1
a






(θi − θ˜ )
and










Following the usual steps yields
Cd − Cc = µλ
2
2mb2
var(w) − σ 2γ m3
(
(3m − 2)λ + m2µ)
2(m2a)2
− σ 2θ (2m − 1)




432 D. A. Malueg, A. J . Yates
References
Bernheim B, Whinston M (1986) Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Q J Econ
101:1–31
Böhringer C, Hoffman T, Lange A, Löschel A, Moslener U (2005) Assessing emission regulation in Europe:
an interactive simulation approach. Energy J 26:1–22
Commission of the European Communities (2008) Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and
of the council amending directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading system of the Community. Brussels 23 January 2008
Convery F, Redmond L (2007) Market and price development in the European Union emissions trading
scheme. Rev Environ Econ Policy 1:88–111
Hahn R (1984) Market power and transferable property rights. Q J Econ 99:753–765
Kruger J, Oates W, Pizer W (2007) Decentralization in the EU emissions trading scheme and lessons for
global policy. Rev Environ Econ Policy 1:112–133
Oates W (1999) An essay on fiscal federalism. J Econ Lit 37:1120–1149
Vives X (2002) Private information, strategic behavior, and efficiency in Cournot markets. Rand J Econ
33:361–376
123
